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The United States and the International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute was the culmination of years of anticipation towards developing a
permanent court to violators of international law. The treaty drawn up in Rome (hence the name)
was established 17 July 1998 by 120 signatory nations. There are (as of 14 November 2005) 100
nations who are parties to the International Criminal Court (ICC Website – Assembly of State
Parties, n.d.). The United States, while a leader in the development of the ICC (AMICC - US &
ICC Info, n.d.; Republican Policy Committee, 2004 ) initially hoped to have the UN Security
Council (of which the U.S. is one of the permanent 5 with veto power) control which cases the
ICC is allowed to take. This was to attempt to maintain U.S. control over its personnel
(specifically military and other officials).
President Clinton refused to allow the U.S. to sign on to the Rome Treaty until December
31, 2000, the deadline established in the Treaty, due to concerns over “significant flaws in the
treaty” (Clinton, 2000). President Clinton stated “I will not, and do not recommend that my
successor submit the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent until our fundamental concerns
are satisfied” (Ibid). The major concern was that the ICC would invade sovereignty rights of
nations and refuse to be encumbered by Article 17 (specifically subsections 1a, 1b) of the Treaty,
that issues under the treaty are inadmissible “unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution” (Rome Statute of the ICC, 1998, p. 17).
President Bush, having concerns similar to President Clinton, has not submitted the Rome
Treaty to the Senate to perform its “advise and consent” to the treaty. On May 6, 2002 President
Bush notified the United Nations (UN) that the U.S. would not be a party to the ICC and
renounced the commitment made on December 31, 2000 (Republican Policy Committee, 2004).
Instead the US is working towards bilateral arrangements, under article 98, with nations party to
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the Rome Treaty, to grant immunity to US personnel (Coalition for the ICC – USA Country Info
website) and prevent US personnel from being brought before the ICC. Several countries are
refusing to cooperate with US goals even after the threat of withdrawal of military and financial
assistance. Also, under the American Servicemembers’ Protections Act (ASPA) any entity of
local, state of federal government is prohibited from cooperating with the ICC (no arrest,
detention, extradition, seizures, mutual assistance, or permit any investigative activity authorized
by the ICC (ASPA, 2002, Sec. 4). After failed votes in the UN Security Council to pass
resolutions to grant UN personnel immunity, American troops were removed from several UN
Peacekeeping missions and vetoed continuation of the entire UN Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (UNMIBH) (U.S. Mission to the European Union, 2002). ASPA also allows the
President to use all means necessary to free certain US agents and officials from captivity of the
ICC, including military force (see ASPA, section 8).
It is apparent that the U.S. is unreceptive to the idea of joining the ICC until substantive
changes are made with regard to the treaty. Currently, the ICC’s goal is to “promote the rule of
law and ensure that the gravest international crimes do not go unpunished” (ICC website – About
the Court, n.d.). Specifically, those “gravest” of crimes include “genocide”, “crimes against
humanity”, “war crimes”, and “crimes of aggression” (Rome Statute of the ICC, 1998, p. 8). This
court secured jurisdiction under the Rome Treaty on July 1, 2002.
Whereas combating these evils is noble and right, definitions must be specific. The Rome
Statute does continue and specifically define what each of those crimes entail in Articles 6, 7,
and 8. Herein lays some potential problems. For example, Article 7 -1(k) defines an aspect of
“crimes against humanity” as “Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” Could the U.S., by
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refusing to recognize an EU-recognized “right” to homosexual marriage, be interpreted one day
by the ICC as being inhumane and intentionally causing great suffering to mental health (in
violation of Article 5 – 1(b))? The U.S. would likely be “unwilling to carry out the
investigation” of the alleged crime (by the government itself), and hence permit the ICC to take
action. If United States’ legal interpretive history is any example, this certainly is a possibility.
Similarly, Article 7- 2(g) defines persecution as “the intentional and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or
collectivity”. The same example regarding homosexuality could apply here as well. There are
many more examples that could be drawn out of the text of the Rome Statute, but this should
suffice in illuminating part of the reason the Rome Statute has “significant flaws” (Clinton, 2000,
p. 1).
U.S. Ambassador Stephen Minikes set forth four formally stated obstacles to the U.S.
joining the ICC while addressing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE):
1. the ICC has assumed jurisdiction over nationals of countries not party to the Rome
Treaty, to include government officials and military servicemen;
2. there is little accountability over the ICC and its prosecutors and it is feared that
politically motivated attempts to investigate and prosecute U.S. servicemen will ensue;
3. the ICC can unilaterally decide whether an American investigation or prosecution was
adequate;
4. the ICC undermines the role of the UN Security Council in determining if a state has
committed an “act of aggression” (4 July 2002).
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Jack Spencer, senior policy analyst at The Heritage Foundation adds that the ICC as it currently
stands also is antithetical to the principles fought for in the American Revolution; namely, that
the “American system of government is based on the consent of the governed, and Americans
have the right to be tried in accordance with the laws enacted by their elected representatives, to
be judged by their peers, and none other” (10 July 2003). Spencer continues by offering three
additional reasons that the ICC immunity should be supported:
1. “Americans are not the problem”
2. “American criminals are successfully prosecuted by the American judicial system;”
3. “Americans cannot be expected to contribute to coalitions without ICC immunity” (10
July 2003).
Until there is willingness on the part of the Rome Treaty participants to understand the
legal ramifications under the Constitution to the U.S. they will not understand the principled
stand taken by both the current Republican administration and the previous Democrat
administration. It seems unlikely that the U.S. will obtain the desired revisions to the treaty; its
implementation may have progressed too far. The only real remaining option is to continue to
pursue individual bi-lateral agreements with other nations to get their agreement not to assist the
ICC in investigating or prosecuting American personnel under Article 98 of the Rome Treaty.
There does still remain the possibility that an American might have to be freed from the grip of
the court by force under the ASPA. It would seem likely that the ICC would not want to risk
pressuring the U.S. into a situation of such proportion, so it seems unlikely, for the time being,
that the status quo will remain. The U.S. will be extremely fastidious in deciding whether to send
troops to the next peacekeeping mission. But even worse, it could potentially create problems for
soldiers fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq.

U.S. & the ICC, 6
References
AMICC (American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal
Court). (n.d.). U.S. and ICC Info. Retrieved January 14, 2006 from
http://www.amicc.org/info.html.
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA). (14 June 2000). Retrieved January 14, 2006
from http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c106:H.R.4654.IH: .
Coalition for the ICC – USA Country Info website. (n.d.). United States of America. Retrieved
January 14, 2006 from http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/theamericas/unitedstates.html.
Clinton, W. J. (31 December 2000). Statement by US President Bill Clinton, authorizing the US
signing of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Retrieved January 14,
2006 from
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/statements/governments/USClintonSigning31Dec00.p
df
ICC website – Assembly of State Parties. Retrieved January 14, 2006 from http://www.icccpi.int/asp/statesparties.html .
ICC website – About the Court. Retrieved January 14, 2006 from http://www.icccpi.int/about.html.
Minikes, S. (4 July 2002). Statement to the OSCE Permanent Council – U.S. views regarding the
International Criminal Court. Remarks given in Vienna, Austria. Retrieved January 14,
2006 from http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/11726.htm.
Republican Policy Committee. (17 November 2004). Protecting U.S. troops from the reach of the
U.N.’s International Criminal Court. Retrieved January 14, 2006 from
http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/ACF4ECD.pdf.

U.S. & the ICC, 7
Rome Statute of the ICC. (17 July 1998). Article 17. Retrieved January 14, 2006 from
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf.
Spencer, J. (10 July 2003). Bold and Appropriate: Withholding military aid over ICC waivers.
Retrieved January 14, 2006 from the Heritage Foundation archives at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/wm310.cfm.
U.S. Mission to the European Union, (30 June 2002). U.S. rejects ICC jurisdiction
over its peacekeepers. Retrieved January 14, 2006 from
http://www.useu.be/Categories/Justice%20and%20Home%20Affairs/June3002ICCJurisd
ictionUSRejects.html.

